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The wave of Arab uprisings that started in 2011 had offered religious 
and ethnic minorities an opportunity to obtain full rights in a new 
democratic political regime, but a violent turn of events in many 
Arab countries has put religious and ethnic communities under 
unprecedented threats.  In particular, this is the case of Christian 
communities in Egypt, Iraq and Syria who have found themselves 
caught between the rise of radical Islamist groups and the inability of 
political regimes to offer them protection. 
This policy paper seeks to understand how the wave of political 
transitions in the Middle East has influenced the status of Christian 
communities in Egypt, Syria and Iraq; it argues that the weakness of 
state institutions constitutes the imminent challenge that Christian 
communities face at this time. The paper explores possible responses 
to deal with this challenge.
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1) The different Christian responses to the 
Arab uprisings
Christian communities in the Middle East reacted 
differently towards the wave of Arab uprisings. While 
some Christian groups, mainly politically active youth 
and Christian political figures saw it as an opportunity 
to renegotiate the Christians’ status from second-class 
citizens to full citizenship, other actors, mainly the 
various Churches’ leadership, perceived it as a threat to 
their authority and to the powers they had gained through 
longstanding relationships with the autocratic regimes. 
Both in Syria and in Egypt, leaders of the different 
Churches rejected the call for regime change. In Egypt, 
the Coptic Church asked its followers not to participate in 
the protests against the Mubarak regime, while in March 
2011 in Syria, the Council of Bishops in Damascus issued 
a statement describing the Syrian uprising as ‘‘a foreign 
conspiracy”.1 
Part of the Christian youth in both countries rejected the 
Church’s position and has supported the uprisings with 
the aim of building new democratic regimes in which all 
citizens enjoy the same rights regardless of their religious 
affiliation. In Egypt, a segment of the Coptic youth 
established a youth movement to defend Copts’ rights, 
known as the Maspero Youth Union (named after the 
Maspero area of Cairo, where Coptic youth organised 
sit-ins to protest against religious discrimination). In 
Syria, during the first year of the uprising, a group of 
Christians met regularly in Damascus to discuss how 
Christians could support the revolution. They rejected the 
Church leadership’s support for the regime and drafted a 
letter insisting on freedom and dignity for all Syrians and 
delivered it to religious leaders. Another group of Christian 
activists worked to raise awareness of the revolution and 
its goals within Christian neighbourhoods. Among this 
group was Bassel Shehadeh, a young film director who 
went to Homs to make videos on the revolution and lost 
his life there in May 2012 when the regime bombed the 
city.2
1.  To read the full statement on the website of the Syrian 
Orthodox Patriarchate (in Arabic): http://www.syrian-
orthodox.com/readnews.php?id=888 (accessed on 23 
March 2017).
2.  Sabbagh, Rand. Attitudes of Christians in the Syrian 
Capital. In  Playing the sectarian card, edited by Friederike 
Stolleis, 84-86. Beirut Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2015.
Not only did the youth remain politically active, but 
many Syrian and Egyptian Christian figures played an 
important political role after 2011. In Egypt, Coptic 
figures established or joined political parties: Egyptian 
businessman Naguib Sawiris started the Free Egyptians 
Party, and Christian intellectuals such as Hanna Greiss 
were among the founders of the Egyptian Social 
Democratic Party.  In Syria, several Christian figures 
played an important role in the opposition, such as 
George Sabra, former president of the Syrian National 
council and current member of the High Negotiation 
committee, and Abdelahad Steifo, vice president of the 
National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition 
Forces. 
In Iraq, the removal of the Saddam Hussein regime in 
2003 led to different views among Christians. Some 
Iraqi Christians believed that the regime change would 
offer them a chance to ameliorate their status, while 
others feared the rise of the Islamic forces, both Sunni 
and Shia, on the political scene. As was the case in Egypt 
and Syria, the Christian involvement in politics under 
the old regime of Saddam Hussein had been limited and 
it was mainly the responsibility of the religious leaders 
to mediate between their communities and the political 
regime. However, since 2003 the situation has changed 
due to the involvement of Christian political parties in 
the new political regime, such as the United Chaldean 
Democratic Party, the Assyrian Democratic Movement, 
and the Syrian Independent Gathering Movement.  The 
Christian political scene has remained deeply divided 
though due to the lack of coordination between these 
different Christian parties.
The rise of religious forces after the removal of the old 
regimes in Egypt and Iraq, and within the revolutionary 
scene in Syria, has increased Christian concerns over 
their security, which has been reinforced by the tragic 
experience of the Christians in Iraq after 2003. In Egypt, 
the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 2012 
parliamentary and presidential elections increased fear 
among the Copts and led many of them to support the 
military intervention against the rule of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in July 2013. In Syria and Iraq, the situation 
became alarming when the Islamic Caliphate was 
established in 2014 by the self-proclaimed Islamic State.
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2) The main challenge facing Christians in 
the Middle East
As shown in the earlier section, the main challenges facing 
the Christians in the Middle East before and during the 
Arab uprisings derive from the discrimination policies of 
the old regimes and from the rise of Islamist movements. 
However, recent developments in the region have placed 
Christian communities in front of an even more serious 
challenge, which emerges from the growing weakness of 
state institutions. 
In this case, the weakness of state institutions refers to 
state institutions’ inability to enforce order, to maintain 
security and to provide public services. 
If state institutions are unable to enforce law, the lives 
and properties of many Christians are endangered. In 
Iraq, religious militias, both Sunni and Shia, have often 
tried to impose their rules in the territories that they 
control. Some of these militias have targeted Christian 
properties, as is the case in Bahgdad where religious 
militias have occupied Christian properties and used 
their networks within state institutions to manipulate 
ownership contracts. According to the Iraqi Christian 
MP, Yonadam Kanna, mafias and militias claiming 
affiliation to the Popular Mobilisation Units and religious 
parties have forcibly seized many Christian properties.3 
In Mosul, Sunni Jihadi groups were active long before 
the establishment of the so-called Islamic Caliphate. 
Christian women in particular have suffered from these 
conservative groups. Many of them had to wear the 
headscarf to protect themselves.4 According to findings 
from a 2016 survey led by the Norwegian Church Aid on 
the perceptions and experiences of religious minorities 
displaced in the Kurdistan Region, residents of Mosul 
were the most likely to report experiences of insults 
before the IS occupation (74%), compared with about 
25% in other areas.5
3.  Itiham al-Hashd al-Sha’bi bi el-istilaa a’la amlak al-
masihien fi Baghdad (The popular mobilisation accused 
of taking over Christian properties in Baghdad), Al-Hayat 
newspaper, 6 February 2016. Available in Arabic at http://
www.alhayat.com/m/story/13832716#sthash.jcuoK3gJ.
dpbs
4.  Interview with Mosul-based journalist Suha Ouda, 26 
March 2017. 
5.  The protection needs of minorities from Syria and Iraq, 
World Council of Churches and Norwegian Church Aid, 
2016, p 15.  
Christians in Syria fear a similar scenario. In Damascus, 
some Christians who used to support the Syrian regime 
now complain about the heavy presence of Shia militias 
in Christian areas, which is the situation, for instance, in 
the Christian neighbourhood of Bab Tuma. This presence 
has put social pressure on Christian families and, in 
many cases, obliged them to change their way of living. 
When asked why the Syrian regime allows this strong 
Shia presence in Christian areas that have supported the 
regime, the answer given by a Christian activist was “do 
you think the regime can stop them?”6 
The Syrian state’s inability to enforce security and order, 
and to delegate this authority to other Lebanese or Iraq 
militias, represents a serious concern for the Christians 
of Damascus. 
In addition to the issue of security, the lack of basic 
public services raises another concern for the Christians. 
In Aleppo, some Christians have shown discontent with 
the poor public services provided by the state and accuse 
the regime of focusing investment on the coastal region 
only.  Because of the deterioration of public services, a 
few months ago a Syrian bishop warned the regime not to 
test the patience of the Christians in his area.
Although Egyptian state institutions are more stable than 
those in Iraq and Syria, in recent years state capacities 
have also been weakened in Egypt, so much so that 
Egypt’s President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi himself recently 
called it a pseudo-state. In North Sinai for example, 
Christian families have been facing assassinations and 
forced displacement due to the lack of security control. 
In February 2017, more than 70 Christian families left the 
city of Al-Arish in Northern Sinai after receiving threats 
from the Sinai branch of so-called Islamic State. State 
institutions were also slow in dealing with the arrival of 
these families in the city of Ismailiyah and it was mainly 
the church who offered shelters to them. The inability 
of state institutions to act fast and efficiently in cases of 
sectarian tensions between Muslims and Christians has 
put many Christians in danger. 
This challenge has led many Christians to migrate from 
the Middle East. This migratory phenomenon has been 
taking place over the last five decades, but it has accelerated 
in the past few years, particularly in Iraq and Syria. While 
there are no official statistics, estimated numbers of 
Syrian Christians fell from 15% of the total population in 
6.  Interview with a Syrian activist, 23 March 2017. 
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the early 1980s, to 4.8% in 2008.7 After the 2011 uprisings, 
the figure is estimated at no more than 2%.  The situation 
was similar in Iraq where the number of Christians was 
estimated at 1.4 million in 2003, and now they constitute 
less than 400 thousand.8 While many Christians could still 
deal with state discrimination and the rise of the Islamic 
groups, the weakness of state institutions and its inability 
to provide basic public services, including security, has 
led many of them to believe that their children have no 
future in these countries. 
3) How can the Christians in the Middle 
East be protected?
In a meeting between a Syrian bishop and a German 
official, the latter asked how the international community 
could protect Christians in Syria. The bishop answered 
that they should work to protect all Syrians, not only the 
Christians. This reaction is idealistic, but also rational. 
The bishop knows very well that the future of the Christian 
minority in Syria is linked to the future of the Muslim 
majority. Addressing the challenges facing the Christians 
in the Middle East cannot be done independently from 
addressing the challenges facing the region as a whole. 
The future of the Christians in the Middle East is strongly 
connected to the future of other religious and ethnic 
communities and it would be naïve to think that the 
solution to the current crisis of the Christians invokes 
the adoption of measures that would protect only the 
Christians.  
What is needed is a wider approach that goes beyond 
sectarian solutions, with structural reforms to the state 
aimed at rendering it efficient, democratic and secular, 
i.e. with the same rights for all religious and ethnic 
communities. Within this frame several recommendations 
can be made: state institutions and particularly the 
security forces need to be reformed to increase efficiency 
and lower corruption; a democratic and transparent 
decision-making process should be consolidated and all 
7.  Salam Kawabibi, The migration of Syrian Christians, 
Middle East Institute, 19 April 2010 (Available online: 
http://www.mei.edu/content/migration-syrian-christians) 
8.  Al-A’nf wel Tashadoud yehadedan al-A’irak bikhousara 
masihieih (violence and extremism threaten the loss 
of Christians in Iraq), Al-Hayat newspaper, 12 August 
2013. Available in Arabic at: http://www.alhayat.com/
Details/541169
forms of religious discrimination should be terminated’ 
by revising the legal framework at all levels. 
In countries that have experienced an armed conflict, such 
as in Syria and Iraq, there is also a need to promote inter-
community peace-building to overcome the experience 
of the conflict. Given their legitimacy within their own 
communities, religious leaders can play an important role 
in this process.  Dialogue between Christian actors and 
non-violent Islamic groups should also be encouraged.
From the Christian actors’ side, the churches should stop 
playing a political role, as it reinforces the perception 
that Christians are one homogenous actor. This leads to 
a situation in which Church decisions can put the lives 
and property of any individual Christian at risk, even if 
he or she did not actually participate in making a political 
choice. There is no need for the Christians to speak with 
one voice. In fact, it would be productive for Christians to 
participate in different groups and movements according 
to their own political preferences.
Finally, the discourse of certain political voices in the 
US or Europe,  such as the American President Donald 
Trump or the French presidential candidate Marine 
LePen, concerning the protection of the Christians in the 
Middle East can only worsen the situation for Christian 
communities. Such discourse reinforces some Islamist 
propaganda that presents Christians as agents of the 
West. Western political voices need to frame a discourse 
that addresses the problems of all religious and ethnic 
communities, not only those of Christians.
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